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H. E . Carson £sf Sons Ltd. v. City of Moncton*: 
Statutory Enforcement As A Limitation To 
Restitutional Entitlement
CASE SUMMARY
Agents of the appellant municipality orally agreed with the President 
of the respondent company to have the company perform certain work to 
repair a backed up sanitary sewer. Liability for payment for the work was 
to be based upon a determination of an agent of the municipality as to 
which of the parties was responsible for the sewage back-up. Upon com­
pletion of the work, the city denied any liability to pay. It alleged that the 
company was initially responsible for the back-up and alternatively that the 
contract between the parties did not conform with the formalities pre­
scribed by the M unicipalities Act,2 particularly that provision requiring the 
corporate seal of the municipality and the signatures of the mayor and the 
clerk be affixed to any contract to render it enforceable against the city. 
At trial it was found that on the balance of probabilities the company could 
not be held responsible for the initial damage to the sewer. Further, it was 
held that the portion of the M unicipalities Act relied upon by the city could 
not be read so as to require that every emergency would necessitate a 
meeting of City Council to ensure compliance with the provision's for­
malities. Henc^ judgment was directed for the company. On appeal, the 
Court of Appeal of New Brunswick reversed the decision of the trial judge 
and found the contract to be unenforceable against the city. Provisions of 
the M unicipalities Act requiring particular contractual formalities to be ob­
served are imperative and the result of failure to comply with such pro­
visions is unaffected by the fact that the contract in question is executed 
and the municipal corporation has received the benefits thereof .
BACKGROUND
At common law, a municipal corporation could not be held liable on 
a contract which did not bear the corporate seal.3 This ruie of general 
application however had, as early as 1852, been so considerably relaxed 
that a parol contract could be enforced against a municipal corporation 
where the objective of the contract was within the corporation’s purposes 
and the corporation had accepted the benefits derived from the agreement. ‘
'(1982). 42 N.B.R. (2d) 130, (N .B.C.A.).
2R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-22, s.5(2).
’Rogers, The Law  o f Canadian M unic ipa l Corporations, Vol. 2  (2d ed.), (T oron to : Carswell Co., 1971), at p. 
1039.
4See Clarke v. Cuckfield Union (1852), 21 L.J. 349., (Q.B.).
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The resilience of the common law in respect of required contractual for­
malities, such as the affixing of the corporate seal, was not reflected in 
judicial interpretation of legislatively prescribed formalities.
Statutory provisions as to requirements necessary to bind a municipal 
corporation in contract have consistently been held to be mandatory rather 
than directory. The leading authority on the matter of legislatively desig­
nated formalities, such as the corporate seal, is the decision of the House 
of Lords in Young v. Leamington Corp.5 In that case the plaintiff had per­
formed work pursuant to a contrct not under seal and claimed between 
£^000 and £7000 as the balance due under the contract. The municipality 
resisted the claim on the ground that the contract bore no seal. Section 
174 of the Public Health Act provided that:
Every contract made by an urban authority whereof the value or amount exceeds 
£50 shall be in writing and sealed with the common seal o f such authority.6
The Law Lords dealt with the issue of whether the defendant corporation 
could be held liable at common law under the contract and in so doing 
considered the rather unsettled nature of the rule requiring contracts to 
be under seal to be enforceable against a municipal corporation. However 
they unanimously agreed that the matter before them was one of statutory 
construction only. Lord Blackburn reproduced in his judgm ent the follow­
ing excerpt of the reasons of Lindley L.J. in the Court of Appeal:
In support o f  this contention cases were cited to shew that corporations are liable 
at Common Law quasi ex contractu to pay for work ordered by their agents and 
done under their authority. T he cases on this subject are very numerous and 
conflicting, and they require review and authoritative exposition by a Court o f 
Appeal. But, in my opinion, thj question thus raised does not require decision 
in the present case. We have here to construe and apply an Act o f Parlia­
ment . . . contracts for more than £50 are positively required to be under seal; 
and in a case like that before us, if we were to hold the defendants liable to pay 
for what has been done under the contract, we should in effect be repealing the 
Act o f Parliament and depriving the ratepayers o f that protection which Parlia­
ment intended to secure for them .7
The contract was held to be unenforceable against the municipality despite 
the fact that the work under it has been completed and accepted by it. 
Addressing the hardship such a decision would seem to occasion upon the 
appellants, Lord Blackburn found:
It may be said that this is a hard and narrow view o f the law; but my answer is 
that Parliament has thought expedient to require this view to be taken, and it 
is not for this or any other Court to decline to give effect to a clearly expressed 
statute because it may lead to apparent hardship.8
^(1883), 8 A pp. Cas. 517.
6lbtd.. at 5*24.
'Ib id  . at 522.
*!bid, at 522. Lord  Bramwell in a concu rring  ju d g m en t expressed  no sym pathy for the  appellant contractor; 
“ I m ust add  that I do  not agree  in the regre t expressed  at having to come to this conclusion . . . T h e  
decision may be hard  in this case on the plaintiffs, who may not have known the law. T hev and  o thers 
must be taugh t it, which can only be done  bv its en forcem ent." p. 528.
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T h e  view expressed in Young v. Leamington Corp. as to the im perative 
n atu re o f legislative provisions as to formalities in contracts involving m u­
nicipal corporations has been adopted in various Canadian courts.9 T he 
policy basis o f the case even goes beyond instances involving statutorily 
prescribed form alities.10
In the 1954 decision o f the Suprem e C ourt o f C anada in Deglman v. 
Guaranty Trust fc? Constantineauu the rem edial principle o f restitution was 
recognized as part o f the law o f Canada. It may be rem em bered that the 
nephew in Deglman undertook  to do certain chores from  time to time for 
his aun t du ring  her lifetime in re tu rn  for which the aunt prom ised to will 
him a house. A fter her death  it was discovered that the nephew had not 
been devised the property. T h e  prim ary question for the C ourt to resolve 
was w hether the nephew was entitled to any recom pense from his au n t’s 
estate for his services when the alleged contract for the transfer o f land 
was not in writing as required  by the Statute o f Frauds. T h e  Suprem e C ourt 
o f C anada was o f the opinion that the nephew was entitled to rem uneration 
for his services on a quantum meruit basis despite the fact that he could not 
enforce any contract in respect o f the house for want o f compliance with 
the Statute o f Frauds. T h e  C ourt distinguished between recovery upon a 
quantum meruit basis and recovery upon a contractual basis and found that 
the Statute o f Frauds could only be held to defeat the claim in contract;
On the findings o f both courts below the services were not given gratuitously 
but on the footing o f a contractual relation: they were to be paid for. The statute 
in such a case does not touch the principle o f  restitution against what would 
otherwise be an unjust enrichment o f the defendant at the expense o f the plain­
tiff. This is exemplified in the simple case o f part or full pavment in money as 
the price under an oral contract; it would be inequitable to allow the promissor 
to keep both the land and the money and the other party to the bargain is 
entitled to recover what he has paid. Similarly is it in the case o f services given.12
T h e  distinction m ade by the Suprem e C ourt o f  C anada in Deglman in 
the juristic basis o f a claim in contract and a claim in the nature o f restitution 
would seem to be o f particular significance to the case un d er study. While 
Deglman has been acknowledged and accepted by the New Brunswick C ourt 
o f A ppeal13 it found no m ention, m uch less application in the instant case.
9See Urulfd Trust Co. v. Chilliwack (1896), 5 B.C.R. 128, (B.C.S.C.); Pooler v. Municipal District of Patricia.
[1934] 3 W .W.R. 754 (Alta. S.C.) in respect o f the corpora te  seal. But see also Parker v. Lion's Head P.S.
Board. [1934] O  R. 14, [1934] 1 D.L.R. 430, (Ont. C.A.); McMurrai v. East Nissoun P S. Board (1910), 21
O.L..R. 46, (O nt. D.C..). in respect o f the requ irem en t tha t the  contract be in writing. A nd Waterman- 
Waterbury Manufacturing Co. v. Slavanka School District (1929), 23 Sask. L..R. 338, (Sask. C.A.) in respect of
the requ irem en t that business be transacted  at a regu lar o r  special m eeting.
Iuln  Silver's Garage Ltd. v. Town of Bridgewater. [1971] S.C.R. 577, it was found bv the m ajority o f  the C ourt 
that “. .  . the  fact that there  is no provision for the form ality o f a by-law in this regard  does not m ean that 
no form ality w hatever is requ ired  o r tha t the  business o f  the  inhabitants, by whom the town councillors 
are  elected, can be conducted  at the  whim o f  individual councillors o r town em ployees." per Ritchie j. at
p. 587-88.
"[1954] S.C.R. 725.
V2Ibtd., at 728, per Rand J.
’’See City of Moncton v. Stephen (1956), 5 DLR (2d) 722 and Voutour v. Hint Estate (1971), 3 NBR (2d) 671.
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THE PRINCIPAL CASE
Section 5(2) o f  the Municipalities Act provides that:
5(2) Except as provided by regulation, no agreement, contract, deed or other 
document made or issued after January 1, 1967 to which a municipality is a 
party has any force or effect unless it is
(a) sealed with the corporate seal o f  the municipality, and
(b) signed by the major and the clerk.14
In the Carson case, the New Brunswick C ourt o f Appeal found the denial 
o f liability by the municipality based upon this provision to raise a “serious 
and far reaching issue”.15 T h ere  was some question as to the term s o f the 
oral contract and it was found that:
At most, the company had an oral agreement with city officials to do work which 
the city had power to do or to have performed by others under contract . . ,16
Despite acceptance by the C ourt o f the existence o f an agreem ent and 
fu rth e r recognition that the com pany had “at least a moral claim to be paid 
for its services”,17 it was decided that the com pany could not recover due 
to the statute-induced unenforceability o f the contract.
In reaching its decision, the C ourt relied substantially upon portions 
o f The Law  o f Canadian M unicipal Corporations (2nd ed) by Rogers.18 State­
ments in Rogers’ treatise to the effect that statutory requirem ents as to 
contractual formalities are im perative to m ake a contract binding upon a 
municipality and  are uneffected by com m on law exceptions to such re­
quirem ents were cited with approval. C anadian authorites, recognized by 
Rogers in support o f  these propositions and dealing with analagous situ­
ations, were also considered19 and lengthy passages from  Lord B lackburn’s 
judgm ent in Young v. Leamington Corp. concerning the policy considerations 
relevant in construing provisions o f the natu re  with which the court was 
dealing were reproduced .20
T he tenor o f the decision was aptly reflected in the consideration o f 
the effect o f  the m unicipality’s receipt o f  the benefit o f the oral agreem ent. 
T he C ourt held that:
liSupra, footnote 2.
' ‘Supra, footnote 1, at 135.
'*lbtd, at 135.
"Ibid. at 135.
'"Ibid. at 135. el seq. See also footnote 3.
l9Particularlv United Trust Co. v. Chilliwack, supra, footnote 9 and Pooler v. Municipal District of Patricia, supra,
footnote 9.
wSee footnotes 7 and  8.
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In view o f s. 5(2) the city is in a different position from business and other 
corporations where slight circumstances may bring into operation the doctrines 
o f  acquiescence and estoppel.21
T he Suprem e C ourt o f  C anada’s decision in Silver's Garage Limited v. Town 
of Bridgewater22 was relied upon in support o f this finding. Statem ents in 
that judgm en t, quoted at the conclusion o f the decision o f the C ourt o f 
Appeal, provided a terse w arning to parties dealing with municipalities:
Municipal corporations are the delegates o f government to perform the duties 
and exercise the functions imposed by statute upon them as trustees for the 
inhabitants o f a defined locality and as 1 have already stated individuals dealing 
with them must at their peril ascertain that the statutory body which assumes 
to delegate important functions involving the exercise o f discretion to committees 
or persons has in fact the power so to delegate and that the particular person 
dealt with is acting pursuant to due authority so lawfully delegated.25
ANALYSIS
T h e  policy reasons for construing statutory provisions such as s.5(2) 
o f the M unicipalities Act as im perative ra ther than directory is apparent in 
the ju d g m en t in Carson. Protection o f the citizen from  the unauthorized 
depletion o f m unicipal coffers has long been the judicially perceived leg­
islative intention behind the enactm ent o f these types o f provisions. Carson 
however contains policy considerations which militate toward allowing the 
com pany to recover for the services it had rendered .
It was acknowledged by the C ourt o f Appeal that the com pany had at 
least a ‘m oral claim’ for paym ent. T h ere  can be little doubt that the m u­
nicipality had been enriched at the expense o f the com pany by retaining 
the benefits o f the com pany’s labours without paying for them . Passages 
in Deglman indicate that rights derived from  a situation of unjust enrich­
m ent are independent from  contract. Logically therefore, the relevant p ro ­
vision o f the M unicipalities Act should have no effect upon the com pany’s 
right to recover on a restitutionary basis.24
Supra, footnote  I, at 139.
T2Supra, foo tno te  10.
2ilbid, at 592-93, per Ritchie J., ad o p tin g  the statem ent o f Rogers ). in Eastern Securities Co. v. City of Sydney, 
[1923] 4 D.L.R. 717, at 721.
24This w ould ap p ea r so if  the  M um apalitus Act and  the  Statute of Frauds (as in Deglman) are  ot analagous 
effect. In  Pooler v. Municipal District o f Patricia, supra, footnote 9, Ewing j. o f the A lberta Suprem e C ourt 
held the  relevant portions o f  the  statu tes to be so d iffe ren t in effect that writing sufficient to statisfy the 
Statute of Frauds was insufficient to  satisfy a provision o f the Municipalities District Act (Alta) requ iring  a seal 
and  certa in  signatures to be on a con tract for the  transfer ol land. T h e  latter provision was held to be a 
"perem ptroy  statu tory  requ irem en t"  for land transfer by the m unicipality while the fo rm er was charac­
terized as a setting fo rth  "conditions upon  which an action may o r  mav not be b ro u g h t" .......... see p. 759,
et seq.
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T h e fact that the com pany’s m oral claim for paym ent was insufficient 
to perm it recovery for the services rendered  provides a m easure o f  insight 
into the scope o f entitlem ent to restitution in situations such as the one 
un d er study. It has been suggested that the m ere p roof o f pnm a facie  
restitutionary facts is inadequate to entitle a plaintiff to a restitutionary 
rem edy.25 In the instant case the C ourt was confronted  with the com peting 
interests o f the municipal ratepayers and the unpaid contractor. If  the facts 
provided a pnm a facie  basis for the contractor’s claim the protection o f the 
interests o f the municipal ratepayers, as legislatively prescribed, clearly 
furnished a counterbalance to that claim.
If restitution m ight be loosely described as a rem edy for unjust en ­
richm ent, any consideration o f restitution o r a right thereto  m ust focus on 
the “unjustness” o f the enrichm ent.25 W hen a party contracting with a 
municipality fails to observe legislatively enacted formalities designed to 
protect the interest o f  the com m unity at large, is it unjust that that party 
is unable to recover for work it perform ed u n d er the contract? While it is 
difficult not to sympathize with the plaintiff com pany in the present case, 
to allow recovery would be tan tam ount to stripping away the protection 
the statutory provision provides. T o  do so would be to begin relaxing a 
rule strictly observed for the benefit o f m any whereas to deny recovery 
occasions hardsh ip  on relatively few. O n the balance, in H.E. Carson fc? Sons 
Ltd. v. City of Moncton it is the legislative intention to benefit the many which 
prevailed.
PETER ALTEEN*
ibSee  G .H .L. Fridm an “Reflections on  R estitution”, (1976) 8 Ottawa L.R. 156, particularly  pp. 174-181, 
w here the au th o r suggests that the re la tionship  between parties is critical to recovery on a restitu tionary  
basis.
*®ln this context "unjustness" has possibly a w ider scope than  “im m oral” and  may becom e a calculated 
weighing o f  relative benefits and  de trim en ts  in a particu lar disposition.
*B.A. 1979 (M em orial Univ.), LL.B. cand idate  (U .N.B.). 1983
